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1EXPLAINING THE EVOLUTION OF PENSION STRUCTURE
AND JOB TENURE
Abstract
Current and expected job tenure have fallen signi￿cantly over the last two decades. Over the
same period, traditional de￿ned bene￿t pensions, designed to reward long tenure, have become
steadily less common. This paper uses a contract-theoretic matching model with moral hazard to
explain changes in pension structure and job tenure. In our model, a decline in the value of existing
jobs relative to new jobs reduces expected match duration and thus the appeal of DB pensions.
This explanation is consistent with observed trends and suggests an additional consequence of
technological change that has not been closely studied. [JEL Classi￿cation: J32, J63, J65]
Keywords: Pension, De￿ned bene￿t, De￿ned contribution, Contracts, Job tenure
1 Introduction
In the midst of the economic boom of the 1990s, the New York Times suggested that ￿the notion
of lifetime employment has come to seem as dated as soda jerks, or tail ￿ns￿(Kolbert and Clymer
1996).1 Most data sets show that job tenure, especially of male workers, has fallen over the last
two decades, and the Survey of Consumer Finances shows that expected remaining time on the
job declined too. Consequently, total expected job duration of full-time employees in the SCF
fell from 27.2 years in 1983 to 22.3 years in 2001 among men and from 22.5 years to 19.5 years
among women. The decline for women suggests that their rising attachment to the labor force was
tempered by a decline in attachment to a particular job.
Workers have also experienced a major shift in pension coverage since the early 1980s. Tradi-
tional de￿ned bene￿t pensions, designed to reward long tenure, have become steadily less common,
while de￿ned contribution pensions, which are largely portable, have spread. The link between
job tenure and pension trends has not been closely examined, but it o⁄ers insights about both
phenomena. Analyzing this link allows us to bridge key gaps in the literatures on job stability
1We have appropriated this quote, with thanks, from Neumark, Polsky, and Hansen (1999).
2and on the structure of compensation. First, we develop a matching model with endogenous job
destruction that can explain the use of deferred compensation contracts and their connection to
job duration. Earlier models of pensions typically did not incorporate uncertainty about job du-
ration, nor make explicit the nature of the worker￿ s outside option ￿both of which are formulated
in matching models and crucially a⁄ect the value of tenure-based contracts. Earlier models of
job matching rarely incorporated the use of deferred compensation. A group of recent papers has
begun to analyze tenure-based contracts designed to deter on-the-job search;2 this paper uses a
model with a simpler form of moral hazard to highlight how changes in the economic environment
alter the feasibility of such contracts.
Second, we discuss what kinds of shifts in the stochastic productivity process can explain ob-
served trends in job tenure and pension structure. The model does not require a change in the
mean productivity of new matches, which would be di¢ cult to gauge. Instead, we focus on two
less drastic possibilities: (i) an increase in the frequency of shocks that reduce the value of exist-
ing matches relative to new matches, or (ii) an increase in uncertainty about future productivity.
Thus, the model provides possible explanations for the observed decline in job tenure, which few
researchers have analyzed. It also o⁄ers a new, endogenous explanation for the decline in DB pen-
sions that di⁄ers from the focus of other researchers on exogenous changes in pension regulation.
The reversal in emphasis here suggests the possibility that regulatory changes responded to an
underlying increase in worker mobility.
Third, we argue that new technologies have reduced the value of existing jobs relative to new
jobs and possibly uncertainty in the manner which we hypothesize. We document recent patterns
of technological change, job tenure, and pension structure that support the empirical implications
of the model.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss trends in job tenure and pensions
and we argue that regulatory changes do not fully explain the shift in pension structure. In Section
3, we review past research on the functions of DB pensions, which may discourage moral hazard,
motivate match-speci￿c investment, and deter on-the-job search.
In Section 4, we develop a matching model and incorporate Lazear￿ s notions of DB pensions.
We show that a contract that defers compensation conditional on tenure, mimicking a DB pension,
2Burdett and Coles (2003), Stevens (2004), and Friedberg, Owyang, and Sinclair (2005).
3elicits optimal e⁄ort. However, the contract may break down in the face of shocks to the output
process which make it riskier to get bound into a long-term relationship.
In Section 5, we present empirical results. Because comprehensive data are lacking, we do not
estimate the model developed earlier. Instead, we show that there is a strong empirical relationship
between job tenure and pension structure; that the value of long-term jobs appears to have dropped;
and that higher rates of technological change in industries are associated with lower job tenure and
lower DB pension coverage.
In Section 6, we conclude by linking our results to other research on the nature of new tech-
nologies. Many of the phenomena identi￿ed in earlier studies on technological progress support
our explanation behind a decline in the value of long-term jobs. Our results suggest a further
consequence of technological change that has not been closely studied.
2 Background
In this section, we set the stage by presenting trends in job tenure and pension structure. We
also discuss the structure of typical DB and DC pensions. Lastly, we contend that, while pen-
sion regulation has changed a great deal, it does not fully explain the observed trends in pension
structure.
2.1 Trends in job tenure
We ￿nd that both current and expected remaining job tenure fell in the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF).3 Overall, total expected job duration fell signi￿cantly by 18% for men and by
13% for women.4 Our theoretical and empirical analyses later on will draw links between the
decline in both job tenure and DB pension coverage over the same period.5
3The SCF began in 1983 and surveyed a new cross-section every three years, o⁄ering the longest consistent
information on pension coverage and expected remaining tenure; we omit data from 1986, which had an unusual
sampling frame. The primary disadvantages of the SCF are that it is cross-sectional and that industry and occupation
are reported at a very aggregated level (with only 6-7 classi￿cation codes). Other longitudinal data sets are not
suitable; the HRS and NLS focus on particular age ranges that do not re￿ ect the full shift in pension structure, while
the PSID and SIPP have limited information on pension structure and job expectations.
4Early research did not con￿rm anecdotal reports, like the one cited earlier, of a decline in long-term jobs (Diebold,
Neumark, and Polsky 1997). Since then, evidence has mounted of a decline in male job tenure in most data sets
(Neumark, Polsky, and Hansen 1999; BLS 2000; Jaeger and Stevens 1999; Bernhardt, et. al., 1999) except the Survey
of Income and Program Participation (Gottschalk and Mo¢ tt 1999). None of these earlier papers used the SCF.
5Whether the decline in tenure is dominated by voluntary or involuntary mobility remains unclear. Our model
does not distinguish between them, since all matches end endogenously. Moreover, it is irrelevant for our primary
4Current job tenure. Average job tenure of male full-time employees aged 22-59 in the SCF
fell from 9.2 in 1983 to 8.6 years in 2001. Average tenure of female full-time employees rose from
7.2 years in 1983 to 7.9 years in 1992 and then fell back to 7.1 in 2001. Tenure trends tended to
￿ atten between 1995 and 2001 in the SCF and reversed for some subsamples in Table 1. However,
residual tenure declined steadily from 1989 on if we control for business cycle e⁄ects.6
Male job tenure fell across the board by experience level, as shown in Table 1. Average tenure
of men with 0-5 years of potential experience ￿those least likely to have DB pensions ￿declined
signi￿cantly from 2.8 years in 1983 to 2.0 years in 2001. Average tenure of those with 6-15 and
16-25 years of potential experience declined signi￿cantly from 4.9 to 4.0 years and from 9.9 to 8.6
years, respectively. In results that are not shown, tenure fell for workers who attended college as
well as those who did not. Changes in job tenure among women apparently re￿ ect a combination
of increases in labor force attachment early on and secular declines in job tenure later.7 Tenure
rose and then fell a little for those with 16 or more years of potential experience, while it tended
to remain steady early on and then fell more (and statistically signi￿cantly) for those with less
potential experience.
Expected remaining job tenure. The SCF also asked people how long they expected to continue
working for their current employer ￿providing a direct measure of expected job duration, which
is a key element of the model we present later. Expected tenure is noisier than actual tenure,
especially for the least experienced workers, which is the smallest group. However, the series show
generally signi￿cant declines as well ￿so the drop in current tenure in Table 1 re￿ ects more than
a one-time reshu› ing of workers into new jobs. Among full-time employees aged 22-59, expected
remaining tenure fell signi￿cantly for men from 18.0 in 1983 to 15.9 in 1992 and 13.7 in 2001 and
for women from 15.3 in 1983 to 13.6 in 1992 and 12.3 in 2001.
Table 2 shows expected remaining job tenure by gender and years in the labor market. Declines
are observed across the board by gender and experience over the entire period from 1983 to 2001,
contention that tenure and pension trends are linked endogenously; an increase in either voluntary or involuntary job
exits would reduce the appeal of long-term compensation arrangements.
6Similar patterns are seen in the CPS. We removed business cycle e⁄ects by regressing average tenure on the
unemployment rate (either the contemporaneous rate or the average across two years) and analyzing trends in residual
tenure.
7We will focus more on men than women in the rest of the paper, as is common in other research on job tenure
because of confounding supply-side increases in women￿ s labor supply.
5and also from 1992 to 2001 when the questions were completely consistent across years.8 Among
men, expected tenure fell most for those with the least experience. For example, for those with 6-15
years of current tenure, it fell signi￿cantly from 21.8 years in 1983 to 18.7 in 1992 to 15.8 in 2001.
It fell by less for men with current tenure of over 15 years. Again, changes in expected remaining
job tenure among women re￿ ect a combination of rising labor supply together with declining job
tenure. For both men and women, expected tenure declined more for the more educated compared
to the less educated.
Total expected job duration. Adding together current and expected remaining tenure yields an
estimate of total expected job duration. For men, total expected tenure fell from 27.2 years in
1983 to 24.4 years in 1992 (a decline of 10.1%) and 22.3 years in 2001 (a further decline of 8.6%).
For women, the total went from 22.5 years in 1983 and 21.5 years in 1992 (a decline of 4.4%) to
19.5 years in 2001 (a further decline of 9.5%).
2.2 Pension structure and trends
At the same time that job tenure has been declining, DB pensions have become steadily less
common. We con￿rm this using data from the SCF: among full-time employees with a pension,
69% had a de￿ned bene￿t (DB) plan and 45% had a de￿ned contribution (DC) plan in 1983, while
39% had a DB plan and 80% had a DC plan in 2001. Overall pension coverage declined somewhat
at the same time, from 67% of full-time employees in 1983 to 59% in 2001, as part of the general
move away from deferred compensation. Later, we show that the DB pensions that remain seem
to have declined in value as well. All of these trends, moreover, may be muted by persistence in
compensation policies; workers are much more likely to get a new type of pension by changing jobs
than by the employer altering pension features within a job.
2.2.1 The structure of pensions
De￿ned bene￿t pensions. DB pensions o⁄er a de￿ned payout to workers after they leave an
employer. We can summarize its value in terms of pension wealth Pt, the actuarially discounted
real present value of the worker￿ s expected future pension bene￿ts if the job ends in the current
8The decline in expected job tenure cannot be attributed to a decline in the expected retirement age. Both the
expected retirement age and the proportion who said they would never stop working remained roughly ￿ at over much
of the period, and, if anything, rose after 1995.
6year t. Pension wealth accrual is the discounted change in pension wealth 1
1+rPt+1 ￿ Pt, if the
worker stays one additional year and then leaves.
The path of DB pension wealth accrual is typically characterized by sharp spikes. While the
speci￿c parameters of DB plans vary a great deal across employers, Figure 1 shows pension wealth
accrual in a particular DB plan in 1992.9 Spikes are generated at the vesting date and the early
and/or normal retirement dates, depending on the particular pension formula. The late spikes
in DB pension wealth thus discourage worker mobility for many years after a worker starts a job,
while the negative pension accruals later on encourage retirement. Among older workers with a
pension in 1992, median pension wealth was about $200,000 if workers stay in their job until age
65. Allen, Clark, and McDermed (1988) estimated that the pension loss associated with switching
jobs for the average worker aged 35-54 is approximately half a year￿ s earnings.10
De￿ned contribution pensions. Accumulated employer and mandatory employee contributions
to DC plans are a form of deferred compensation.11 The accrual of this pension wealth is much
simpler, though: contributions go into an account which earns a return, and the account is portable
after vesting, which is often immediate. The resulting smooth path of DC pension wealth accrual
shown in Figure 1 stands in stark contrast to DB accrual and makes it clear that DC pensions are
generally tenure-neutral.12
It should be noted that, if long-term matches remain valuable, then employers could include
tenure-based incentives in DC plans to a greater extent than they do. While around 85% of DB
plans currently have cli⁄ vesting at the maximum allowed period of ￿ve years, less than half of DC
plans do. Similarly, employer contributions are based on tenure in only about 10% of DC pro￿t
sharing plans (Mitchell 1999). Recent developments have also reduced the use of tenure-based
incentives in DB plans, with some traditional DB plans getting converted over the last 5-10 years
9Plan data were obtained from employers by the Health and Retirement Survey and have been slightly altered, as
described in Friedberg and Webb (2005), to protect con￿dentiality.
10Gustman and Steinmeier (1993) pointed out, nevertheless, that pension wealth may be quite small at the start
of a job. They argued that the primary e⁄ect of DB pensions is to deter mobility of longer-tenure, rather than
new, workers. Extensions of our model to include investment in match-speci￿c capital would sharpen the distinction
between mobility incentives of shorter and longer-tenure workers.
11Employees are typically forbidden from withdrawing or borrowing against their plan balances (Mitchell 1999).
Voluntary contributions by employees do not constitute deferred compensation but confer tax bene￿ts that may not
apply to other forms of saving. In any case, the tax treatment of DB and DC plans is similar; contributions are
tax-deductible, returns accumulate tax-free, and income is taxable.
12Friedberg and Owyang (2002a) discussed other di⁄erences between DB and DC plans which do not a⁄ect mobility
incentives.
7into cash-balance plans, which are funded as DB plans but accrue pension wealth smoothly like
DC plans (Coronado and Copeland 2003).
2.2.2 Regulation of pension plans
The government has frequently altered and tightened pension regulations since 1974. These changes
have set funding standards for DB pensions, extended tax incentives for DC pensions, and con-
strained the structure of pensions in order to, for example, limit the extent to which they favor
high-earning employees. Researchers have suggested several ways in which regulatory changes may
have caused the shift away from DB pensions. None of these appear to fully explain observed
trends in pension structure, however.
First, as pensions have become increasingly regulated, the costs of administering DB plans
increased. However, the cost of administering DC plans rose at similar rates for all but the
smallest plans (Ippolito 1995).13 Second, Clark and McDermed (1990) claimed that some of the
regulatory changes limited the extent to which DB plans can be designed as incentive contracts
of the type we model later.14 DB pension wealth can still accrue highly nonlinearly, though, as
in the plan shown in Figure 1. Moreover, such a shift could have responded to, rather than
caused, an increase in worker mobility, which might have raised concerns about workers losing
out on expected future bene￿ts. Third, Ippolito (2001, 2003) argued that regulatory changes in
reversion taxes allowed companies to escape their DB pension obligations more easily than before,
which undermined worker con￿dence and motivated the shift to DC pensions. Coronado and
Copeland (2003) found that only about half of the S&P conversions which they examined were in
a position to be in￿ uenced by reversion taxes, however.15 Even where pension wealth is di¢ cult
to appropriate ￿in unionized and government jobs, for example (Ippolito 2003) ￿DB pensions are
becoming less common and DC pensions more common in the SCF. Fourth, a countervailing e⁄ect
arises from enhanced funding standards, which should increase the willingness of workers to accept
DB pensions.
13Kruse (1995) concluded that rising administrative costs might explain some but not all of the decline in DB
pensions between 1980 and 1986. Note also that enhanced tax incentives can explain why DC pensions have spread
but not why DB pensions have disappeared, since a worker can (and many do) have both types of plans.
14Before ERISA established maximum vesting periods, for example, many DB pensions vested only at the normal
retirement date.
15Moreover, a majority of the conversions increased pension liabilities to existing workers.
8Thus, considerable evidence suggests that these regulatory changes fail to explain the entire shift
in pension structure. Our focus on endogenous explanations provides a complementary perspective
and even suggests that regulatory changes may have responded to an underlying increase in worker
mobility.
2.2.3 Other evidence about pension trends
Several sources of evidence indicate that the evolution of pension structure has been associated with
structural shifts in the economy. Employer-reported plan data show that workers have shifted from
jobs that typically o⁄er DB plans to jobs that typically o⁄er DC plans.16 Aaronson and Coronado
(2005) found that both aggregate and industry-speci￿c changes in pension structure in the CPS
were important. In the SCF, we ￿nd that pension coverage shifted at varying rates by type
of job and type of worker. Using analysis-of-variance, year main e⁄ects explain just under half
(48%) of the over-time variation in DB pension coverage ￿so half of the decline occurred uniformly
across types of jobs. Year-industry interactions explain 22%, indicating di⁄ering changes in DB
pension coverage across industries; year-occupation interactions explain 13%, and year-education
interactions explain 15%.17
Other details of pension trends suggest similar factors at work. Inequality in pension coverage
across workers has grown, mirroring patterns in earnings inequality (Bloom and Freeman 1992,
Even and Macpherson 2000) ￿a trend that is frequently attributed as well to structural changes in
the economy. In support of the hypothesis we outline later, Coronado and Copeland (2003) and
Aaronson and Coronado (2005) also found signi￿cant relationships between industry-level labor
mobility and shifts in pension structure. There is mixed evidence about one additional factor.
Aaronson and Coronado argued that the rise in labor supply of married women with children, who
have shorter average tenure, also helps explain the decline in DB coverage. It is not clear, though,
whether the sectoral choices of such women caused or responded to changes in the structure of
16Clark and McDermed (1990); Gustman and Steinmeier (1992); Ippolito (1995); Kruse (1995); Papke (1999).
According to the second and third papers, for example, the movement of workers across jobs explains half of the
shift in aggregate pension structure. We do not use employer-reported data in our later analysis because it lacks
characteristics of covered workers.
17We used survey weights and controlled for age and age squared; employer size; education, occupation, industry,
and union coverage; interactions of occupation with education and with industry; and gender and interactions with
education, occupation, and industry. Friedberg and Owyang (2002b) described pension trends within industries and
occupations.
9compensation.18 Also, we ￿nd that SCF industries and occupations (though highly aggregated)
with greater gains in the share of women in employment did not experience greater declines in the
use of DB pensions.
3 Theories of DB Pensions
Past theoretical research has sought to explain the incentive e⁄ects of DB pensions. The model we
develop later builds on the idea that DB plans are designed to encourage optimal e⁄ort and longer
tenure.
DB pensions as incentive contracts. In a series of papers summarized in Lazear (1986), Lazear
developed models in which employers structure compensation to deter shirking by workers whose
e⁄ort cannot be observed perfectly. A DB pension motivates e⁄ort by workers who do not want to
get ￿red and lose their ￿bond￿ .19 We incorporate this motivation for pensions and then explicitly
de￿ne the nature of uncertainty about job duration and of the worker￿ s outside option ￿ key
elements determining the value of tenure-based contracts. Lazear (1983) argued that DB pensions
also function as severance pay to encourage e¢ cient retirement in models with rising wage pro￿les,
another element of an incentive contract. We could extend our model to generate a rising wage
pro￿le if we imposed restrictions on the extent to which compensation could be deferred through
the DB pension.20 We chose not to include an explicit retirement motive, however, since our model
generates an endogenous termination date.21
Other possible motives for DB pensions. An alternative theory is that DB pensions attract more
productive workers, rather than elicit higher productivity (Viscusi 1985; Ippolito 1994). Empirical
18The authors implemented an interesting instrumental variables strategy, but the instruments are debatable.
In industry-level regressions of changes in pension structure on, among other variables, changes in industry-level
employment of women who are married, have children, etc., the instruments were lagged changes in the same variables.
Pension coverage is highly persistent, though, so lagged changes in labor force characteristics may well have a gradual
e⁄ect on, or gradually respond to, changes in pension structure.
19Related ideas appeared in Becker and Stigler (1974). Similarly, employers may o⁄er DB pensions in order to
recoup sunk costs of hiring, ￿ring, or job-speci￿c investments; or to discourage on-the-job search by workers seeking
better o⁄ers (Burdett and Coles 2003; Friedberg, Owyang, and Sinclair 2005; Stevens 2004).
20Akerlof and Katz (1989) showed that, in the absence of up-front performance bonds, a rising wage pro￿le alone,
without a pension, is insu¢ cient to deter shirking early in the career. On the other hand, wage tilt in Ippolito (1994)
is necessary when the DB pension is too small to deter quits, though Ippolito (1991) found that wage tilt had no
signi￿cant e⁄ect on job tenure, while DB pensions did.
21There is little evidence that a change in retirement motives generated the shift in pension structure, since pensions
of older workers have changed much less than pensions of younger and shorter-tenure workers. If anything, the move
away from DB plans may have increased ￿rms￿use of temporary early retirement inducements (Lumsdaine, Stock,
and Wise 1990; Brown 2000).
10tests to distinguish these motives have faced di¢ culties in resolving identi￿cation problems (Allen,
Clark, and McDermed 1993; Even and Macpherson 1990). Moreover, an endogenous explanation
for a declining use of pensions for screening requires a decline in the value of screening. This
seems implausible given other labor market trends such as the growth in earnings inequality among
workers with similar skills, which has been widely interpreted as an increased return to unobserved
ability that should enhance the need to screen workers.
The observed link between unionization and DB pension coverage has led other researchers to
focus on theories of union bargaining.22 However, evidence cited earlier shows that the decline in
unionized jobs does not explain a great deal of the shift in pension structure. Moreover, in the
model we develop later, a decline in a worker￿ s bargaining power has an ambiguous e⁄ect. It will
make shirking more attractive and thus increase the value of the pension contract, though at the
extreme it destroys the pension contract entirely because the contract can no longer deter shirking
at all.
Motives for DC pensions. As the use of DB pensions has decreased, why have portable DC
pensions become more popular? As we noted above, DC plans are much less likely to include
vesting periods and other tenure-related features, so many of them simply constrain the path of
consumption. A remaining possibility is that pensions have value as a vehicle for saving, perhaps
because individuals have trouble saving adequately on their own or because the government wishes
to increase savings rates. Savings-related motives may help explain the use of both DB and DC
plans but not the tenure-related structure of DB plans nor the shift away from that structure.
4 A Model of Pensions
We develop an incomplete-contracting job-matching model that incorporates insights from past
research on DB pensions. Matching models o⁄er a rich representation of the labor market and
of the e⁄ects of uncertainty which is absent from earlier models of pensions. While many search
and matching models feature exogenous job destruction and focus on the rate and duration of
unemployment, we emphasize endogenous job destruction, which motivates the use of pensions and
determines the duration of employment.
22Freeman (1985) argued that unions give a stronger voice to older, less mobile workers who use pensions to
appropriate rents from younger workers with higher quit rates.
11In order to develop our arguments, we present a Nash bargaining model with moral hazard which
builds on den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000, hereafter DRW).23 As in DRW, moral hazard
induces endogenous match destruction. We propose a pension-contract model that discourages
moral hazard and eliminates ine¢ cient match destruction, although we do not demonstrate that it
is the only contract that would do so. After presenting the pension model, we discuss changes in
the productivity process that would lead agents to abandon the pension contract.
4.1 The baseline model with moral hazard
Our model illustrates the ine¢ ciency generated when unobservable e⁄ort on the part of the worker
a⁄ects future match productivity. While we specify a simple form of moral hazard ￿low e⁄ort
today destroys the continuation value of the match ￿we will indicate how it stands in for a richer
model in which a worker decides whether to invest in match-speci￿c capital that keeps the output
distribution from drifting down, while skill-speci￿c technological changes erode the stock of capital.
The matching market. A continuum of atomistic unemployed workers and ￿rms who are
searching in the labor market in a given period meet each other with probability ￿.24 The matched
worker and ￿rm i get an output draw Yi;t and decide whether to produce. If they do not produce,
they return to the matching market next period. They will decide to produce if the output draw
exceeds a threshold value R, re￿ ecting the surplus from producing today and from the option to
get another output draw and produce in future periods.
Production. Output Y is drawn from a distribution F(y) which is the same for all new
matches.25 Thus, while agents are identical ex ante, matches are heterogeneous in their actual
production draws. In each period, agents decide whether to continue producing or rejoin the labor
market and draw their outside options. If the match breaks up, the worker and ￿rm receive bw
and bf from their contemporaneous outside option (with bw +bf = b) and expect ￿w and ￿f (with
￿w + ￿f = ￿) from re-entering the matching pool. If they produce, the agents split the match
23Valletta (1999) did not write down a model but discussed how extensions to a similar model by Ramey and
Watson (1997) could help explain the decline in job tenure. Ramey and Watson modeled bilateral shirking in a pure
contract-theoretic framework without search. Our approach extends the severance contract which they outlined to
the search and matching model employed in DRW.
24Friedberg, Owyang, and Sinclair (2005) explore the role of tenure-based compensation when workers search while
on the job.
25At this point, we assume a stationary distribution of Y and suppress the time subscript; later, we discuss the
implications of nonstationarity.
12surplus by Nash bargaining, with a share ￿ going to the worker and 1 ￿ ￿ going to the ￿rm.
In addition agents are subject to moral hazard; for simplicity, we limit consideration to moral
hazard by the worker. A worker who shirks gains xw this period but reduces future match
productivity and thus the continuation value g(R). We assume that shirking causes g(R) to go to
zero, so the match is severed.26
We can de￿ne the joint continuation value of the match as
g (R) = ￿
Z 1
R
(y + g(R))dF(y) + ￿
Z R
0
(￿ + b)dF(y): (1)
The continuation value equals the value of the match next period, discounted at rate ￿, if output
exceeds the threshold value R, plus the discounted value of the outside option if output falls below
R.








((1 ￿ ￿)(y + g (R) ￿ ￿ ￿ b))dF(y) + ￿(￿f + bf): (3)
These values depend on the probability of re-matching ￿ and subsequently drawing a satisfactory
level of output (exceeding the threshold R) or alternatively remaining in the matching pool until
the subsequent period.
Joint surplus from the match is de￿ned as the value of the match less the value of re-entering
the matching pool, Y + g(R) ￿ ￿, and gets split according to the worker￿ s bargaining share ￿.
This means that we can de￿ne the wage paid to the worker each period as the worker￿ s portion of
the surplus plus his outside option less his portion of the match continuation value. Under Nash
bargaining, this is equivalent to the worker￿ s share of output, so wt = ￿Yt.
Incentives in the presence of moral hazard. When the agents produce, the current value of the
match is Y +g (R), current output plus the continuation value of the match. This depends on the
26Suppose that match productivity is a function of match-speci￿c human capital which must be kept current at a
cost x
w to the worker. When the worker fails to update her speci￿c human capital, match productivity falls enough
to induce the ￿rm to sever the match.
13threshold output level R, which satis￿es
R + g(R) = ￿ + maxfxw;bg; (4)
where ￿ = ￿w +￿f and b = bw +bf. When Yt = R, agents are just indi⁄erent between continuing
or breaking up the match. If the moral hazard premium xw exceeds the outside bene￿t b, then
R rises by the di⁄erence, as we demonstrate below. The increase in R in the presence of moral
hazard raises the expected value of the wage, which compensates the worker for forgoing the moral
hazard payment.
We illustrate the impact of moral hazard on sustainable matches in Figure 2. Y +g(R), match
output plus the continuation value, appears on the vertical axis, and ￿ + b, the outside option,
appears on the horizontal axis. The Joint Productivity Threshold (Z) shows matches in which the
￿rm￿ s payo⁄(current period pro￿t Y ￿w plus continuation value gf) exceeds its total outside option,
while the worker￿ s Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraint shows matches in which the worker￿ s
payo⁄ (wage w plus continuation value gw) exceeds the value of shirking plus the worker￿ s outside
option. IC lies a distance of xw ￿b above Z, since moral hazard imposes an additional requirement
on current productivity to sustain the match. Matches below Z are jointly unproductive and are
destroyed. Matches above IC are productive enough that the worker chooses high e⁄ort. Matches
between IC and Z are broken up because workers choose low e⁄ort even though the matches are
jointly productive. Essentially, xw > b creates a wedge between e¢ cient and sustainable matches
that require extra productivity in order to overcome shirking.
These scenarios are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that no steady-state displacements occur in the model without moral hazard
(i.e., that Yt+g￿￿￿b > 0). For any xw > b and nondegenerate F(y) with ￿nite support in the model
with moral hazard, the match is incentive compatible and thus is sustained if w+gw > xw+￿w+bw,
while the probability of match dissolution due to incentive incompatibility is strictly between zero
and one.
The incentive compatibility condition presented in the proposition requires that the worker￿ s
payo⁄ (wage w plus continuation value gw) exceed the value of shirking plus the worker￿ s outside
14option. The proposition further implies that even though matches are jointly productive, there
exists some Y for any xw such that the match is not incentive compatible.27
An example. Suppose that the agents draw productivity Y from a standard uniform distribu-
tion. Then, in the solution to (4) that avoids the moral hazard problem, reservation output must
satisfy:
RMH = xw +
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿





where k = 1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ R).28 If xw > b, it drives up the minimum output RMH required
to sustain the match, changing the resulting values of g and ￿. RMH exceeds the reservation
threshold computed in the absence of moral hazard,
RN =







since higher productivity is required to deter the worker from shirking and sustain the match.29
The impact of moral hazard. Given the model (4), the worker will shirk if the value of not
shirking and sustaining the match (the wage plus continuation value) is smaller than the payo⁄
from shirking (the premium xw and outside option). A higher value of ￿, the worker￿ s bargaining
power and consequent share of future match rents, reduces the incentive to shirk. A higher ￿,
the probability of re-matching, raises the value of the outside option and hence the incentive to
shirk. A higher b, the contemporaneous outside option, as long as b < xw, increases the reservation
threshold RMH but by less than it would increase RN. This is because match surplus, and therefore
the wage and continuation value, continue to be determined by b, but R is now determined in part
by xw as well, so b has a reduced e⁄ect.
To understand the magnitude of the e¢ ciency loss in response to some of these parameters, we
27A formal proof of a similar proposition appears in DRW. They show that for output below the reservation
threshold, the derivative of R with respect to x is strictly positive. Thus, if no steady state dissolutions occur, x
can be raised such that R > 0, so some matches that are dissolved in the MH model would not be dissolved in the N
model.
28The solution is obtained by jointly solving the expressions for reservation productivity R, the outside option ￿,
and the continuation value g.
29A higher value of the output threshold R raises the continuation value g but also raises the value ￿ of re-entering
the matching pool. R itself is a positive concave function of the contemporaneous outside option b. Additionally,
for high values of b, R increases in the discount rate ￿ and decreases in the probability of rematching ￿. Lastly,
RMH > RN because x
w > b and 0 < R < 1.
15compare aggregate output in period t in the moral hazard model, ~ YMH =
R 1
RMH dF(y) = 1￿RMH,
with aggregate output in the Nash model, ~ YN =
R 1
RN dF(y) = 1 ￿ RN. The productivity loss
resulting from shirking is
￿ =





which is always non-negative since RN < RMH < 1.
Figure 3 plots the productivity loss ￿, shown on the vertical axis, as the shirk premium xw and
the outside option b vary, given other reasonable parameter values (￿ = 0:3, ￿ = 0:95, ￿ = 0:5).
Since output per period lies between 0 and 1, we analyze values of xw and b that are of the same
order of magnitude. As we noted above, the productivity loss increases with xw and b, since
they make shirking more attractive. For example, the productivity loss ranges from 0 to 15% for
b = 0:66 and xw rising from 0.66 to 0.7, and it reaches as high as 50% when b and xw exceed 0.9.
4.2 The pension model
Matches in the moral hazard model are vulnerable to incentives that raise payo⁄s to the worker
today but destroy the future value of the match. This generates ine¢ cient outcomes by forcing
the dissolution of matches that are jointly productive. Here, we show that a deferred payment
conditioned on match tenure ￿structured like a DB pension ￿can change the worker￿ s incentives.
The contract induces the worker to devote full e⁄ort and can be constructed to ensure that the
match yields the same positive net productivity, so matches are e¢ cient. We demonstrate that
the pension contract remains incentive compatible and avoids ine¢ ciency associated with moral
hazard.
The pension contract. Suppose that the ￿rm and worker write a contract fw;W;Tg with the
following elements:
￿ The worker collects wage w = w in each period when he is working and t < T.
￿ The worker collects W(T), a lump sum, if he is still employed at time T.
Without loss of generality, we will set w = 0 for the rest of this discussion.30 We will discuss
30Enforcement considerations or risk aversion (as in Burdett and Coles 2003) would a⁄ect the actual tradeo⁄
between w and W.
16the choice of W and T later. We assume that the ￿rm is prevented from breaking up the match
if Yt > RN and t < T. We also assume that the match breaks up if Yt < RN, even if t < T.
Thus, the ￿rm pays out W at time T as long as Yt > RN each period. The assumption that ￿rms
are prohibited from severing productive matches but allowed to sever unproductive matches rests
on the observability of Yt and RN. It is crucial, however; if a ￿rm could not break up a match
once a contract is in place, the worker would have no incentive not to shirk. Therefore, we must
appeal to reputation e⁄ects or age discrimination laws which make it more di¢ cult to ￿re older
workers systematically than to lay o⁄ workers when output su⁄ers. Empirical evidence over the
period in which we are interested indicates that obvious breach of deferred compensation contracts
by employers is infrequent.31
The worker￿ s incentives. Under the pension contract, the worker￿ s continuation value gw
P
depends on the wage contract fw;W;Tg. Again assuming w = 0, then at the outset
gw
P = ￿TW(T): (5)
We need to demonstrate several things about the worker￿ s incentives in order to prove that
the pension contract is feasible. First, if the worker accepts the contract in period 1, she will
not sever the match later. The continuation value grows in later periods since the value is ￿xed
but the worker discounts it less. Thus, by induction, she will not sever the match in any period
t > 1 unless the productivity distribution shifts (which we have not allowed for yet) such that the
worker￿ s outside option grows relatively more valuable.
Next, we summarize in the following proposition the worker￿ s incentive to shirk after accepting
the contract, along with the worker￿ s incentive to accept the contract at the outset:
Proposition 2 Suppose the worker￿ s payo⁄ to shirking is xw. Then, the worker will accept the
contract fw;W;Tg as long as the shirk premium satis￿es xw < gw
P + w ￿ ￿w. Speci￿cally for the
case w = 0; if xw < gw
P ￿ ￿w in each period, then the worker will choose high e⁄ort.
31Ponti⁄, Shleifer, and Weisbach (1990) found relatively small gains from DB plan termination in ￿rms experiencing
hostile takeovers, and Gokhale, Groshen, and Neumark (1995) found mixed evidence that hostile takeovers in a small
sample of eight ￿rms led to reductions in extramarginal wages of workers. Cornwell, Dorsey, and Mehrzad (1991)
found little evidence of opportunistic dismissal of pensioned workers in a nationally representative survey. Petersen
(1992) found that DB plan termination was more likely in ￿rms with more valuable implicit promises to workers, but
that taxes had a greater e⁄ect on termination, while Coronado and Copeland (2003), as we mentioned earlier, found
that a majority of cash balance conversions actually raised pension liabilities to existing workers.
17Thus, the worker accepts the contract and does not shirk if the shirk premium is smaller than
the value of the contract less the value of the outside option. We can check to see under what
circumstances the contract in which the worker is paid w = 0 until time T and W at time T satis￿es
the inequality. Substituting (5) for gw and substituting for the value of ￿w
N we solved for above,
this requires
xw < ￿T￿tW(T) ￿ ￿￿
b(k ￿ ￿(1 ￿ RN)) + ￿J
(1 ￿ ￿)k
(6)
for all t = 1;2;:::;T. As we mentioned above, the constraint is more likely to bind the lower is
t. As time passes, the worker gets closer to the pension payo⁄ and is less likely to shirk and risk
getting ￿red.
Note that condition (6) determines the minimum W necessary to provide the worker with the
proper incentives to ensure the match is both incentive compatible and yields joint net positive
productivity. The actual choice of W could be modeled as depending on ￿, the bargaining weight
that determines the split of current-period surplus.32
Comparative statics. In order to understand how condition (6) governs feasible values of W
and T, we analyze the impact of the threshold level of output RN and then the fundamental
parameters that determine RN. (6) identi￿es the highest sustainable shirk premium xw for a given
conditional output J =
R 1
R ydF(y) = 1
2(1￿R2
N) and severance risk ￿ = Pr[Yt < RN] =
R R
0 dF(y) =
RN. These two quantities are in tension as the reservation threshold RN changes. Higher RN
reduces conditional output J and hence the value of re-entering the matching pool by reducing
the likelihood that a productive match is formed; this raises the sustainable shirk premium for a
given W. However, higher RN also raises the severance risk ￿, so that staying matched becomes
more uncertain; this reduces the sustainable shirk premium. At low RN, the e⁄ect on J dominates
the e⁄ect on ￿, making the required pension payo⁄ W for a given termination date T relatively
insensitive to changes in RN. As RN increases, ￿ takes over and small changes in the reservation
threshold have increasing e⁄ect on the sustainability of the pension contract.
Figure 4 shows how the minimum value of the pension W that satis￿es (6) is a⁄ected by some of







￿yt+ijt ￿ ￿ w
￿
.
This is also the expected future discounted value of the match less each period￿ s wage payment, where RN is the
severance risk, yt+ijt = E [yt+ij￿t], and ￿t is the information available when the contact is written.
18the model￿ s fundamental parameters. It shows how the minimum W, expressed as a percentage of
the total expected value of the match at time T, changes as the shirk premium xw and the vesting
date T change, given other reasonable parameter values (￿ = 0:3, ￿ = 0:95, ￿ = 0:5, b = 0:5).
Again, since output per period lies between 0 and 1, we analyze values of xw of the same order of
magnitude.
It is apparent from Figure 4 that the promise of the future pension o⁄ering the worker a share
of all future expected output has a powerful e⁄ect in deterring moral hazard. Thus, raising the
shirk premium from 0.5 to almost 1 has little e⁄ect on the minimum required W for a given T.
Figure 4 also shows the tradeo⁄ between the term of the pension and its payo⁄; as noted above,
an earlier termination date T allows for a lower payment W, given xw. If xw is 0.7, for example, a
termination date of 25 periods requires a pension worth at least 27% of total expected Nash output,
while a termination date of 15 periods requires a pension worth 10% of total output.
However, at su¢ ciently high values of xw (approaching or exceeding 1, the maximum value of
per-period output) the pension contract is no longer viable: The only way to deter shirking is to
continue to increase W as xw rises, but this is only pro￿table for the ￿rm if it also extends T.
Extending T raises the risk that the match will be severed before T, though. At some point, which
is governed by (6), the ￿rm cannot o⁄er a high enough W to get the worker to accept the necessary
increase in T, even if the worker￿ s discount rate ￿ gets very close to 1.
Summary. The contract fw;W;Tg will be accepted by both agents and enhances e¢ ciency
when xw satis￿es (6). In the next subsection, we discuss how changes in the productivity process
a⁄ect the pension contract.
4.3 Expected tenure and the productivity process
The previous subsection demonstrated how the DB pension (the lump-sum payo⁄ W at time T)
can resolve the ine¢ ciencies resulting from moral hazard. In the model we laid out above, match
productivity does not drift as it does in DRW, so the continuation value remains constant. The
pension contract will also be e⁄ective if match productivity drifts upward, boosting the continu-
ation value over time. In this section, we analyze the implications of other speci￿cations of the
productivity process ￿downward drift that reduces the productivity of existing matches relative
to new matches, or an increase in uncertainty. Later on, we discuss the corresponding technology
19shocks which we have in mind.
Changes in the stochastic productivity process of the type we discuss here will reduce expected
job tenure, so it is useful to de￿ne worker￿ s expected tenure as E(￿) = 1
1￿R. The recurrent theme
is that, if the decline in job tenure is severe enough, it will render the pension contract infeasible,
since the worker no longer accepts deferral of payment because the risk of exogenous separation
becomes too high.
Downward drift in the productivity of existing matches. Initially, we considered only matches
which were jointly productive. Suppose now that output each period is drawn from successively
less favorable probability distributions, so Ft+1(y) > Ft(y) for all t. This implies a time-dependent
continuation value in which gt+1(R) < gt(R). The Nash bargaining model then implies an increas-
ing reservation productivity Rt+1 > Rt, since conditional output J > 0 for all y; only a higher draw
will make the agents willing to continue the match in the face of worsened long-term prospects.33
The resulting condition Rt+1 > Rt has implications for job tenure. The severance risk ￿ =
R Rt
0 dFt(y) increases when either the distribution becomes less favorable or reservation output rises,
increasing the likelihood of separation. This lowers expected job tenure and thus the expected
value of the pension to the worker, since the probability that the match lasts until T declines. As
we noted at the end of the previous subsection, this e⁄ect will reduce the maximum sustainable
shirk premium, and at some point the contract breaks down. Put di⁄erently, as the likelihood
of exogenous separation rises, the payo⁄ date in the contract must get increasingly close to the
initiation date for the worker to accept the risk of exogenous separation. However, reducing T
also reduces the nominal value W of the pension which the employer is willing to o⁄er. At some
point expected tenure E(￿) becomes small enough that the worker will not accept the contract.
Consequently, a decline in expected tenure will lead to fewer and less valuable pension contracts.
Increased uncertainty in the productivity process. The productivity threshold R is una⁄ected
by a change in the variance of the productivity process. Hence, a mean-preserving spread in the
productivity distribution raises the probability that the match will fall below the cuto⁄ value R at
some future date, if R lies below the mean of the productivity distribution.34 Again, the terminal
33In the type of human capital model we have alluded to, these shocks can result from the introduction of a new
technology which erodes the value of existing skill-speci￿c human capital.
34The implications of a mean-preserving spread are reversed if R lies above the mean, but this case seems unlikely
as it requires that the mean productivity draw is insu¢ ciently high to warrant preserving matches.
20date T must be reduced for workers to accept the pension, but that reduces the nominal value W
of the pension which undermines the value of the pension to workers.
Summary. The preceding discussion provides intuition as to the breakdown of DB pensions.
Matches with stable or increasing continuation values can bene￿t from deferring payment to the
worker in order to provide incentives that are unavailable in a standard Nash bargaining model.
These contracts preserve jointly e¢ cient matches that would ordinarily be severed. Matches with
decreasing continuation values, however, might not sustain the pension contract. Additionally,
a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of future productivity draws may su¢ ciently raise
uncertainty about match duration such that the pension contract cannot be sustained.35
4.4 Government regulation in the pension model
In the moral hazard model, e¢ ciency is enhanced by moving from the standard Nash contract
to the DB pension contract if expected match tenure is su¢ ciently high. We have focused on
changes in the productivity process that undermine such contracts, but it is also possible that they
are undone by government regulation. Suppose the government dislikes the outcome that some
workers su⁄er exogenous separation before they collect their pension and requires that workers be
guaranteed their accrued pension wealth if matches end before T. This destroys the ￿rm￿ s ability
to in￿ uence worker e⁄ort.
We can evaluate the loss resulting from rekindling the moral hazard problem based on our
earlier de￿nition of the e¢ ciency loss ￿ = RMH￿RN
1￿RN arising from moral hazard in the absence of
pensions. Figure 3 showed how the e¢ ciency loss ￿ increases as the shirk premium xw and the
outside option b rise, given other reasonable parameter values. For values of xwand b around 0.5
(recall that output draws are bounded between zero and one), the e¢ ciency loss can reach 8%, while
for values around 0.65 to 0.7, it can be twice as high. Thus, our model presents the policymaker
with a choice between social e¢ ciency versus helping a fraction of workers who experience bad luck
by mandating portability of pensions.
35One must consider other possible contracts at this point. Ramey and Watson (1997) showed that contracts with
severance payments or punishments can sustain matches in the e¢ cient but incentive-incompatible region. However,
such contracts are rare, perhaps because they are not easily enforced or yield socially ine¢ cient litigation upon
separation.
215 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we present empirical evidence that supports the hypotheses we have presented. It is
di¢ cult to estimate our model directly, given the absence of linked employee-employer longitudinal
data or even employee longitudinal data with details about the structure of compensation and
productivity. The alternative is to test implications of the model that relate to pension structure
and job tenure. There are several types of evidence from the SCF and the CPS that we bring to
bear.36
First, we show that job tenure is related to pension structure in the way that our model pre-
sumes. We ￿nd that workers with a DB pension and with more valuable DB pensions have longer
tenure than workers with DC pensions or workers with no pensions. Second, we show outside
evidence that the value of long-term jobs has dropped, since DB pensions have declined somewhat
in value and estimated earnings-tenure pro￿les have ￿ attened out considerably. Third, we present
evidence that links technological progress to both the structure of compensation and job tenure.
Industries with higher rates of computer use and overall investment have lower rates of DB pension
coverage and lower average job tenure, and further these relationships were more negative in the
1990s than in the 1980s. If, instead, government regulation induced the shift in pension structure,
there would be no reason to expect such links.
5.1 Pension structure and job tenure
We show that workers with DB pensions have longer current and expected total job tenure than
both workers without pensions (as in Allen, Clark, and McDermed 1993) and workers with DC
pensions (in contrast to Gustman and Steinmeier 1993). While we view pension type as the best
proxy for the degree to which compensation is tied to tenure, we ￿nd further that workers with
more valuable DB pensions have longer tenure, controlling for the level of earnings. Note that
we do not estimate a structural model of compensation and mobility, so our approach does not
36We noted earlier the reasons we concentrate on tenure and pension information from repeated SCFs and on tenure
information from repeated CPSs. We also use some data from the April 1993 CPS, the last time questions were
asked about pensions. The notes to each table describe the sample, de￿nition of variables, and estimation details.
When using SCF data in this section, all coe¢ cient estimates and standard errors are computed from regressions run
on multiple implicates (Rubin 1987).
22distinguish whether DB pensions cause longer tenure.37
Regressing job tenure on pension type. We ran several regressions, separately for men and
women, using both the SCF and the last pension supplement of the CPS.38 In the SCF results
shown in Table 3, all of the pension variables have statistically signi￿cant e⁄ects on job tenure.
Male workers with a DB pension have been in their jobs about 5 years longer than workers without
a pension, depending on the speci￿cation. Female workers with a DB pension have been in their
jobs about 4 years longer. Workers with both types of pensions have been in their jobs about half
a year longer than workers with only a DB pension, but the di⁄erence is generally not statistically
signi￿cant. In comparison, workers with a DC pension have been in their jobs 2-3 years longer
than workers without a pension, signi￿cantly shorter than workers with a DB pension. While job
characteristics such as industry and occupation may explain both pension structure and job tenure,
including such controls in the second and fourth columns reduces the estimated e⁄ect of pensions
on tenure by a year or less.
The relationship between pensions and job tenure remains strong when year e⁄ects are included
in the third and fourth columns, so it does not re￿ ect a spurious correlation between two trending
variables. Moreover, it persists if we interact pension type with year, in results that are not
shown.39 Therefore, we can conclude that the same workers who are experiencing a decline in DB
pension coverage are spending less time in their jobs. Although we do not ascribe a structural
interpretation to the magnitude of the estimated e⁄ect, the observed decline in DB pension coverage
between 1983 and 1998 is associated with a decline in current job tenure of 0.9 years for males and
0.6 years for females, according to regressions (4) and (8); this is of the same order of magnitude
as the observed decline in tenure.
37As mentioned earlier, we were unconvinced by previous attempts to estimate endogenous selection into jobs
with DB pensions. While including earnings on the right-hand side in our regressions is just one possible source
of endogeneity, it furthers our goal of describing the empirical relationship between tenure and the structure of
compensation, while controlling for the level. A caveat to these results is that workers report pension type with
considerable error (Gustman and Steinmeier 1999); yet, Chan and Stevens (2004) found that retirement behavior
responds to misperceptions about pension incentives.
38We run all tenure regressions separately by gender because men and women exhibited di⁄erent secular trends.
It would be preferable to run regressions on the job exit hazard rather than on current tenure, which represents
incomplete spells, but the mean of complete and incomplete job spells will be the same if spell length is not duration
dependent. If it is, then a linear regression on tenure can be viewed as a ￿rst-order Taylor expansion of more
complicated speci￿cations (Freeman 1980). We obtained similar results from regressions on the log of tenure, as in
Even and Macpherson (1996).
39The estimated response to DB pensions declined by 2 years or less between 1983 and 2001 and remained signi￿-
cantly higher than the response to DC pensions throughout the sample period.
23We ran additional regressions with similar results that are not shown here. We used total
expected job duration (the sum of current and expected future tenure) as a left-hand side variable.
Workers with a DB pension have total expected tenure that is 5.0-7.0 years longer than workers
without a pension, while workers with a DC pension have total expected tenure that is 2.5-4.0 years
longer. We estimated almost the same relationship between pension structure and job tenure in
the April 1993 CPS.40
Regressing job tenure on the value of DB pensions. We used data reported in the SCF to
compute the value of DB pensions and added that information to regressions like those reported in
Table 3. In some regressions, we include information which individuals with DB pensions report
about the pension bene￿t they expect to receive if they stay in their jobs as long as intended.
Because that is endogenous with expected tenure and reported with error, in other regressions
we include the average bene￿t imputed on the basis of earnings, industry, occupation, education,
unionization, employer size, and gender. This is similar to the approach in Gustman and Steinmeier
(1993), described in more detail below, of including an imputed measure of pension backloading.
We ￿nd some interesting results in Table 4. First, a higher value of one￿ s DB pension at
retirement is associated with signi￿cantly longer tenure. The semi-elasticity of tenure with respect
to the log monthly pension bene￿t (the statistic reported by most of the post-1983 sample) is
around 0.6 when self-reported information is included (in regressions labeled a) and 0.3-0.45 when
the average bene￿t is included (in regressions labeled b).41 This implies, for a male with the
median value of expected future pension bene￿ts ($958 per month in 2001 dollars) and according
to (4a), that job tenure is half a year longer than for someone with the 25th percentile value ($400)
and almost a year shorter than someone with the 75th percentile value ($2076).
Second, once we control for DB pension value, then the additional e⁄ect of having a DB pension
is reduced, compared to Table 3. It lies in a range between 0.5-3.5 years (versus 4-6 years in
Table 3), in some cases not statistically distinguishable from zero and in others not statistically
distinguishable from the e⁄ect of DC pensions, which remains in the range of 2-3 years. Together,
these two ￿ndings support our hypothesis that DB pensions are used to extend job tenure, since
40These coe¢ cient estimates are reported in Friedberg and Owyang (2002b). It is noteworthy that the estimated
e⁄ect of pensions declines by only a couple tenths of a year when detailed industry and occupation codes reported in
the CPS are included.
41The numbering of the regressions in Table 4 parallels that in Table 3. When we use total expected tenure on
the left-hand side, the estimated coe¢ cients are about twice as large.
24the di⁄erential e⁄ect of DB pensions on tenure is operating through the value of the pension.
Comparison to other results. The results in the regressions described above, duplicated in two
data sets, di⁄er importantly from Gustman and Steinmeier (1993). They found similar mobility
rates for workers with DB and DC pensions, perhaps in part because of di⁄erences in the time
period and in the measurement of key variables in their data. They used the SIPP, which is a panel
and allowed them to focus on mobility rather than tenure.42 However, they used data from only
1984-85, before DC plans became common. Also, in their words, ￿the SIPP question sequence on
plan type is atypical￿(p.303, 1993) and overstated the prevalence of DC plans.
Another di⁄erence was that they added a selection-adjusted imputed measure of the compen-
sation available in alternative jobs on the right-hand side of their mobility equation. This is more
ambitious than our estimation approach. Their results suggested that pensioned workers faced
worse alternatives relative to their current jobs than did non-pensioned workers and that the com-
pensation di⁄erential had a greater e⁄ect than pension wealth in deterring mobility. However,
this result hinges on knowing the terms of jobs available to workers who do not move, though no
motivation was o⁄ered for the identifying exclusion restrictions used in predicting mobility and
imputing alternative compensation.43 Lastly, they found another anomalous result that we did
not ￿in their estimates, pension backloading had a much greater e⁄ect in deterring mobility than
current compensation, but in our estimates the semi-elasticity of tenure with respect to earnings
is somewhat larger (in the range of 1.5-2.5 years) than the semi-elasticity with respect to pension
value.
To sum up, their evidence that the alternative compensation premium, rather than the structure
of DB pensions, explains the pension-mobility relationship is not convincing, in our view. In
contrast to their results for a particular data set and year, we ￿nd evidence of a robust long-term
relationship between pension structure and mobility.
42The reliability of job mobility data in the SIPP is unclear, since it does not show the decline in job tenure which
is apparent in other surveys, as we discussed earlier.
43Age, marital status, children under 18, and home ownership were included in the mobility equation but excluded
from the current and alternative compensation equations. However, these variables are correlated with wages in
simple OLS regressions using our data, probably because they reveal something about unobservable productivity.
Pension coverage was included in the compensation equations but excluded from the mobility equation.
255.2 The value of long-term jobs to workers
While we do not have data to estimate changes in the value of a long-term job, we have some
evidence about the value to workers. We show two ways in which tenure-related compensation
appears to have shrunk: DB pensions appear to have lost value, and the degree to which earnings
rise with tenure has fallen a great deal. After presenting these results, we will discuss how they
can be interpreted in light of our model.
The value of DB pensions. As described above, from 1989 on the SCF reports the bene￿t
people expect to receive when they leave the ￿rm.44 In order to detect changes over time, we
regress this variable on year dummies. However, the expected pension bene￿t depends not only on
the degree to which a DB pension defers compensation but also on the worker￿ s expected tenure,
so we include detailed controls for current and expected remaining job tenure. We also control
for current earnings, in case overall compensation declined, and in some cases we control for other
individual and job characteristics to isolate shifts in the terms of particular jobs, rather than shifts
in the composition of jobs.
We ￿nd mixed results, with somewhat high standard errors. With the caveat that they may to
some extent re￿ ect changes in tenure, the regressions in Table 5 show that DB pensions declined
substantially in value between 1989 and 1998, while increasing somewhat in 2001, though not
signi￿cantly. For the average male with a DB pension, according to the results in speci￿cation (2),
the expected monthly bene￿t declined steadily from 1989 through 1998 for a statistically signi￿cant
total of $352, which compares to the average in 1989 of $1801. The expected monthly bene￿t then
rose by $150 between 1998 and 2001, and the total decline of $202 was not statistically signi￿cant.
Among females as well, according to speci￿cation (4), the changes tended to be negative but non-
monotonic. The overall decline of $294 by 1998 was, again, statistically signi￿cant and compares to
an average 1989 bene￿t of $1091, while the decline of $246 by 2001 was not statistically signi￿cant.45
The relationship between tenure and earnings. A common practice in the labor literature
is to estimate a ￿return to tenure￿ , with current earnings on the left-hand side and tenure and
44While the SCF asked many questions about pensions, we are hesitant to use self-reported information at any
greater level of detail, given the lack of familiarity most people display about speci￿c features of their pensions.
45Based on the estimates in Table 5, we veri￿ed that the decline in the value of DB pensions, if it occurred for
exogenous reasons, is not nearly large enough to explain the overall decline in job tenure.
26other measures of human capital on the right.46 If we ￿nd that the tenure premium has fallen,
it suggests that long-term jobs have become less valuable. Farber (1999) described the problem
of interpreting such estimates, since many theories (including ours) predict that compensation
is structured to in￿ uence tenure. He argued that such estimates are interesting, nonetheless, in
revealing the nature of ￿rm-level compensation structures. This motivates our analysis as well, and
later we interpret the results in light of ours and other possible models. We used data from CPSs
between 1983 and 2002, since the CPS o⁄ers large sample sizes and, importantly, detailed industry
and occupation controls.47 We estimated log earnings equations for men and women separately
and included quartics in tenure for each CPS year, while controlling for the level of earnings and
allowing the e⁄ects of several other covariates to di⁄er across years.
Table 6 shows the earnings premium paid to average male and female workers with 5, 10, 15, 20,
and 25 years of tenure, compared to a worker beginning a job. The results support our claim that
the value of long-term jobs declined. After some gains in the 1980s, the tenure premium dropped
sharply after 1987 for men and after 1987-91 for women. Notably, it continued to drop between
1996 and 2002 while actual tenure tended to ￿ atten out, as we noted earlier. For example, the
earnings premium enjoyed by males with 10 years of tenure rose from 21.3% in 1983 to 27.6% in
1987 and then dropped to 14.1% in 2002.48 The overall decline in the tenure premium between
1983 and 2002 was statistically signi￿cant, and it fell the most for males with 15 years or fewer of
tenure. The drop-o⁄ for females occurred a little later but was sharper ￿the earnings premium
rose from 24.0% in 1983 to 29.4% in 1987 and then fell to 11.4% in 2002 for females with 10 years
of tenure.
Balan (2003) found an earlier decline in the tenure premium for both men and women in the
PSID. Using the panel data to instrument for job tenure, he estimated a signi￿cant drop of roughly
3/4 of a percentage point per year between 1981 and 1992 among private-sector non-unionized male
46While our model does not feature a rising wage pro￿le, we alluded earlier to extensions in which a rising wage is
part of an incentive contract to lengthen job duration.
47We do not use earlier CPS tenure supplements because the wording of key questions changed. We adjusted
the reported tenure data for half-year rounding among those with 1-2 years of tenure, though in a simpler way than
Diebold, Neumark, and Polsky (1997). We did not adjust the data for heaping at ￿ve-year intervals, as they did;
in their 1996 paper, they showed that adjustments for rounding and heaping did not a⁄ect conclusions about the
magnitude of job tenure trends. When we tried adjusting the sampling weights, as they did, for di⁄erences in
nonresponse to the tenure question by age, sex, and race, the results were virtually identical.
48As a point of reference, Topel (1991) estimated that the selection-corrected earnings premium for males with 10
years of tenure was over 25%.
27workers, with a slightly greater decline for recent entrants to the job market.
In additional results, we ￿nd that the tenure premium dropped in industries with declining
tenure, supporting the idea that these trends are linked. We regressed the median real tenure
premium on average job tenure in the same industry and found that a one-year decline in average
job tenure is associated with a signi￿cant 2.3 percentage point decline in the tenure premium.49
Interpretation. Our results show that both DB pensions and the earnings premium associated
with longer tenure have shrunk in value. What can we infer from this about the value of long-term
jobs? Since we control for the level of current earnings, these changes are not a consequence of an
overall reduction or redistribution of match surplus but are related speci￿cally to the duration of
jobs.
Our model illustrated the tradeo⁄ between the term and the value of the pension contract ￿
as the likelihood of exogenous separation increases, the worker demands an earlier payo⁄, but the
size of the pension that the ￿rm is willing to o⁄er falls and at the limit the viability of pensions is
threatened. Thus, a decline in the value of remaining DB pensions supports our hypothesis that
the value of long-term jobs fell. If increased regulation explained the shift away from DB pensions,
it is not clear why it would also reduce the value of remaining DB pensions, while if anything tenure
pro￿les might be made steeper.
The literature o⁄ers a number of explanations for a rising tenure premium, and the inferences we
might draw from observing it decline are generally consistent with our main arguments. As noted
earlier, a rising tenure pro￿le may itself be a component of a tenure-based incentive contract. In this
case, a reduction in the value of tenure-based contracts would not only ￿ atten the tenure pro￿le, but
it would also reduce selective mobility, a more general explanation for observing a tenure premium
whereby matches end selectively when their productivity draws fall below a reservation level. A
￿nal explanation is that workers are paid their marginal product and match-speci￿c productivity
rises with tenure, so a decline in the tenure premium would result from declining productivity of
long-tenured workers ￿also a sign that the value of long-term jobs may have declined.
49We computed tenure premia and average job tenure in 45 two-digit industries that employed at least 100 people in
each CPS survey. The regressions are weighted by the number of people from the CPS in each cell. If we control for
year and industry e⁄ects (accounting for economy-wide changes and industry-speci￿c values of the tenure premium),
then the correlation is a little greater.
285.3 Technological change, pension structure, and job tenure
We have shown that both actual and expected job tenure fell and that deferred compensation has
shrunk, from which we infer that the value of long-term jobs has declined. In our model, this will
occur if there is an acceleration of shocks that erode the productivity of existing matches relative
to new matches, or simply an increase in uncertainty about the future productivity of matches.
We hypothesize that a shift in the nature of new technologies has had such e⁄ects.
As above, and in research by others on the nature and impact of new technologies, there are
no data to test this directly. However, we demonstrate that some commonly used measures of
technological change are related to both pension structure and job tenure as we hypothesize. We
use data on computer use in jobs, which o⁄ers a straightforward way to measure the di⁄usion of
a major new technology.50 We also use data on investment, the capital stock, and total factor
productivity (TFP) growth, standard measures of both embodied and neutral technological progress
used in the macroeconomics literature.51 We use industry-level data on these measures and match
them to industry averages of job tenure from repeated CPSs and pension structure from the April
1993 CPS.52 As above, we include average earnings in the regressions in order to detect changes in
the structure of compensation while controlling for the level.53 The April 1993 CPS also included
information on ￿rm size, which can control for possible scale economies in o⁄ering DB pensions as
well as adopting new technologies.
Technological change and pension structure in industries. The only data source reporting both
pension structure and earnings in detailed industries is the April 1993 CPS. We regress average
DB pension coverage by industry on each measure of technological change and report the results
in Table 7. We ￿nd that computer use has a negative relationship with DB pension coverage (in
the upper left panel), and it becomes signi￿cant when we control for ￿rm size ￿so larger ￿rms
50In October 1984, 1989, 1993, 1997, and September 2001, the CPS asked individuals whether they used a computer
at work. We compute average computer use in 50 industries in each year. In 2001, we also include as computer
users those who reported that they had a home computer and used it for work.
51We use investment, capital, and TFP data from the Jorgenson Total Factor Productivity Series, which covers 21
manufacturing sectors and 14 other non-manufacturing sectors annually from 1959 to 1996; the manufacturing sectors
are quite disaggregated, but other sectors are not. While we average the data over 10-year periods, we obtained
generally similar estimates using averages over 5 years.
52These were measures used by Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) and Bartel and Sicherman (1999) to determine
the impact of technological change on workers. It is much less useful to try to match these measures of technological
change to SCF data, since SCF industry codes are so highly aggregated.
53Also, we weight regressions by the number of workers in each industry so the results re￿ ect economywide averages.
29had higher rates of both computer use and DB coverage. Earlier changes in computer use do not
have a signi￿cant coe¢ cient. TFP growth, investment, and capital all have signi￿cant negative
relationships with DB pension coverage (in the lower left panel), and the estimated coe¢ cient is
hardly a⁄ected when controlling for ￿rm size.
Based on the most detailed speci￿cation in column (3), an industry with a one standard devi-
ation higher rate of computer use has a 4.0 percentage point lower rate of DB pension coverage,
which is 8.3% of the mean rate. Based on the speci￿cation in (7), an industry with a one stan-
dard deviation higher rate of TFP growth (investment) has a 3.9 (4.2) percentage point lower rate
of DB pension coverage. Note that the impact of observed variation in all of these measures of
technological change is quite similar.
Technological change and job tenure in industries. Table 7 also reports the relationship between
job tenure in the April 1993 CPS and measures of technological change. Computer use, invest-
ment, and the capital stock all have a signi￿cant negative relationship with job tenure. Adding
￿rm size dummies again increases the estimated coe¢ cient on computer use (in the upper right
panel), though less dramatically than it did in the DB pension regressions. It raises the estimated
coe¢ cient on investment as well (in the lower right panel), though it increases the standard error
considerably, while it substantially reduces the unexpected positive (and highly insigni￿cant) coef-
￿cient on TFP growth. Based on the speci￿cations in (6) and (1), a one standard deviation higher
rate of computer use is associated with 0.87 years less in average job tenure, or 10.0% of average
tenure, and a one standard deviation higher level of investment is associated with about 0.6 years
less.
We also use repeated CPS job tenure supplements to explore the relationship over time with
these measures of technological change, in Table 8. Computer use has a negative, signi￿cant
relationship with job tenure in speci￿cations (1) and (3); however, it shrinks a little and loses
signi￿cance when controlling for year e⁄ects in job tenure in (2) and (4), and the estimate is
smaller than it was in the April 1993 regressions. Investment and the capital stock also have a
negative and signi￿cant association with job tenure in (7) and (9); the coe¢ cients only decline
slightly when year e⁄ects are included in (8) and (10), and they remain a little larger than the
estimate in the April 1993 regressions.
Interestingly, we ￿nd evidence that these relationships changed over time when the sample is
30split before and after 1990. All the relevant coe¢ cients are smaller and/or more negative in the later
sample. Comparing (5) and (6), computer use has a negative but insigni￿cant relationship with
job tenure before 1990 and a more negative and now signi￿cant relationship after 1990, even when
year e⁄ects are included. Similarly comparing (11) and (12), the relationship between investment
and job tenure becomes more negative and signi￿cant after 1990, while the unexpected positive
e⁄ect of TFP growth on job tenure disappears.
Summary. We ￿nd a consistent negative association between measures of technological change
and industry-level averages of DB pension coverage and job tenure. Aaronson and Coronado
(2005) found a similar relationship, using other data and other measures of technological change,
strengthening our claim that the nature of technological advances has changed in a way that
undermines the value of long-term jobs.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have speci￿ed a model of DB pensions and job tenure. DB pensions eliminate
ine¢ cient job destruction resulting from moral hazard; in more complex models, the moral hazard
can take the form of searching on-the-job or failing to invest in job-speci￿c capital. The use of DB
pensions is undermined, however, if expected job tenure declines. We have shown in this paper
that both actual and expected job tenure fell along with the use of DB pensions.
We also used the model to demonstrate the types of changes in the stochastic productivity
process which reduce expected job tenure and hence the use of DB pensions. In particular, we
focused on shocks that increase uncertainty about future match productivity. To that end, we
showed that industries which have experienced more rapid growth in technological progress also
experienced greater declines in job tenure.
These results complement a large body of research on the shifting nature and pace of technolog-
ical changes, suggesting that they have had the e⁄ects on jobs that we have in mind. Researchers
have found that the di⁄usion of new, especially information-related, technologies has had a pow-
erful e⁄ect on the level of compensation by raising earnings inequality across jobs (Gottschalk
1997, Acemoglu 2002). Our hypothesis is that it has altered the structure as well as the level of
compensation.
31The key reason for rising inequality, according to this literature, is that new technologies are
largely skill and ability-biased. The average skill level of workers rose more in industries that
experienced higher rates of investment in general and of computerization in particular (Autor,
Katz, and Krueger 1998). Case study evidence suggests further that new technologies require not
just greater but also new skills. Computer use is, obviously, one of the new skills; employers and
individuals continue to devote substantial resources to computer training, even while computers
have grown easier to use over time.54 Besides that, computers have automated routine tasks while
altering and often making more complex the performance of non-routine tasks (Levy and Murnane
1996, Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2002). Computerization has brought on further changes in
required skills, workplace organization, and the delivery of services, requiring substantial training
and other adjustment costs (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 2002).
Our evidence adds to this literature by suggesting that jobs have been reorganized in ways
that loosen the ties of long-term relationships between workers and ￿rms. Moreover, since both
expected remaining job tenure and the use of DB pensions in new jobs has declined, our results
indicate that the changes in the productivity process are permanent.
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Table 1:  Current job tenure 
 Men  Women 
  Average, by years of potential experience 
  0-5 6-15  16-25  26-35  0-5 6-15  16-25  26-35 
1983   2.8  4.9   9.9  14.2   2.3   4.9   7.7    9.9 
1989   2.2  4.8   8.9  14.7   1.9   4.0   7.6  10.5 
1992   2.3  4.8   8.1  14.1   2.1   4.8   8.2  11.8 
1995   2.0  4.6   8.5  12.9   2.1   4.4   8.4  10.7 
1998   1.7  4.4   8.6  13.6   1.7   4.0   7.4  11.1 

















  0.8 
  (0.8) 
          
 
Data source:  Survey of Consumer Finances from 1983, 89, 92, 95, 98, 01.  Respondents were asked “How many 
years in total have you worked for this employer?” 
Sample:  Full-time employees aged 22-59, except those who reported tenure that exceeded potential experience 
plus two years (about 1.5% of the sample). 
Details:  Means and standard errors are computed from multiple implicates (Rubin 1987), using survey weights.  
Years of potential experience is defined as age minus years of completed education minus six. 
 
Table 2:  Expected remaining job tenure 
 Men  Women 
  Average, by years of potential experience 
  0-5 6-15  16-25  26-35  0-5 6-15  16-25  26-35 
1983  18.3 21.8 20.2 13.2 15.3 18.3 17.9 11.4 
1989  11.0 18.4 17.8 11.6     8.7 13.2 14.6     9.8 
1992  16.7 18.7 17.5 11.9 13.6 15.8 14.9 10.9 
1995  11.1 17.3 16.3 11.4     8.7 15.4 13.6 10.2 
1998  10.6 16.1 16.3 11.0 10.1 13.0 14.7 10.4 
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Data source:  Survey of Consumer Finances from 1983, 89, 92, 95, 98, 01.  Respondents were asked “How many 
years do you expect to continue working for this employer?” 
Sample:  Same as in Table 1. 
Details:  Means and standard errors are computed from multiple implicates, as in Rubin (1987), using survey 
weights.  Years of potential experience is defined as age minus years of completed education minus six. 
   Approximately 14% of respondents answered that they would “never stop”; we imputed a specific answer for 
them as follows:  (1) we used their answer if they responded to a later question about when they would retire from 
all work; or else (2) we used their answer if they responded to a later question about when they would retire from 
full-time work; or else (3) we assumed that they would work until the age of seventy.   
   In 1995-98, “less than a year” was coded as a separate answer, in which case we assigned a value of zero; in 
1983-92 one is the smallest coded response, and for respondents who were coded with a value of one, we randomly 
assigned an answer of zero in the same proportion as is observed among those answering zero or one in 1995-98 
(which will lead to a slight underestimate of the decline in tenure). 
 
  
Table 3:  Job tenure and pension coverage (OLS regression results, SCF) 
  
  Dependent variable:  years of current job tenure 
      
  Men  (mean of dependent variable = 9.51) 
  (1) (2)    (3) (4) 
      
Independent  variables:      
      
  has DB pension only  5.72
*** (0.26)  4.35
*** (0.28)  5.68
*** (0.27)  4.54
*** (0.28) 
  has DC pension only  2.56
*** (0.25)  2.24
*** (0.25)  2.57
*** (0.25)  2.29
*** (0.26) 
  has DB & DC pension  5.81
*** (0.31)  5.05
*** (0.32)  5.78
*** (0.32)  5.06
*** (0.32) 
      
  Women  (mean of dependent variable = 7.62) 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
      
Independent  variables:      
      
  has DB pension only  4.17
*** (0.31)  3.47
*** (0.32)  4.14
*** (0.31)  3.54
*** (0.32) 
  has DC pension only  2.24
*** (0.25)  2.06
*** (0.25)  2.23
*** (0.25)  2.06     (0.24) 
  has DB & DC pension  4.46
*** (0.35)  3.92
*** (0.37)  4.47
*** (0.35)  3.99
*** (0.37) 
      
Regression also includes:       
      
   age  yes  yes  yes  yes 
   job variables  no  yes  no  yes 
   year effects  no  no  yes  yes 
   year*job variables  no  no  no  yes 
      
 
Data source:  Survey of Consumer Finances 1983, 89, 92, 95, 98, 01. 
Sample:  Full-time employees, excluding those who report tenure in excess of potential experience plus two 
(about 1.5% of the sample); those whose pension type is unknown (approximately 0.5% of the remaining 
sample); and those with earnings in the top or bottom 1% of the distribution. 
Details:  The coefficient estimates and Huber-White standard errors are computed from regressions run on 
multiple implicates, as in Rubin (1987).  The regressions were weighted using survey weights.  
* indicates a 
confidence level of at least 90%, 
** 95%, 
*** 99%.   
   Specifications:  (1) and (5) include real weekly earnings (in 2001 dollars), age and age squared.  (2) and 
(6) add job variables (4 education, 6 industry, 6 occupation, and 6 firm size dummies, industry* occupation, 
education*occupation, union coverage).  (3) and (7) add year dummies.  (4) and (8) add variables from (2) 
and (3) along with year*industry, year*occupation, year*education, year*union coverage.  
Table 4:  Job tenure and DB pension characteristics (OLS regression results, SCF) 
   
  Dependent variable:  years of current job tenure 
        
  Men  (mean of dependent variable = 9.51) 
 (1a)  (4a)  (1b)  (4b) 
         
Independent  variables:      
         
has DB pension only  2.32
*** (0.37)  1.11
*** (0.46)  3.37
*** (0.32)  2.71
*** (0.45) 
has DC pension only  2.68
*** (0.25)  2.44
*** (0.26)  2.64
*** (0.25)  2.33
*** (0.26) 
has DB & DC pension  2.33
*** (0.42)  1.55
*** (0.50)  3.38
*** (0.40)  3.16
*** (0.51) 
      
DB pension benefits at retirement (natural log of real present value, 1998 dollars): 
 Individual-reported    Average 
      
  log value of monthly benefit  0.56
*** (0.06)   0.57
*** (0.07)  0.37
*** (0.05)   0.28
*** (0.07)
  log value of lump-sum benefit  0.31
*** (0.12)   0.35
*** (0.12)  0.21
*   (0.12)   0.20
*   (0.12) 
  log value of pension wealth  0.55
*** (0.05)   0.53
*** (0.05)  0.43
*** (0.05)   0.41
*** (0.05)
  log weekly earnings  1.33
*** (0.23)   2.31
*** (0.25)  1.38
*** (0.23)   2.37
*** (0.25)
      
  Women  (mean of dependent variable = 7.62) 
 (5a)  (8a)  (5b)  (8b) 
         
Independent  variables:      
 
has DB pension only 
       
1.05
*   (0.65)  0.23     (0.75)  1.82
*** (0.51)  1.55
*** (0.54) 
has DC pension only  2.37
*** (0.25)  2.25
*** (0.24)  2.34
*** (0.25)  2.17
*** (0.24) 
has DB & DC pension  1.30
*** (0.60)  0.57
     (0.71)  2.11
*** (0.52)  1.95
*** (0.55) 
      
DB pension benefits at retirement (natural log of real present value, 2001 dollars): 
 Individual-reported    Average 
         
  log value of monthly benefit  0.59
*** (0.11)   0.64
*** (0.14)  0.43
*** (0.09)   0.38
*** (0.10)
  log value of lump-sum benefit  0.42
*** (0.19)   0.46
*** (0.20)  0.34
**  (0.19)   0.31
**  (0.19)
  log value of pension wealth  0.36
*** (0.08)   0.32
*** (0.07)  0.22
*** (0.07)   0.21
*** (0.07)
  log weekly earnings  1.69
*** (0.29)   2.52
*** (0.36)  1.80
*** (0.30)   2.58
*** (0.37)
      
Regression also includes:       
 
   age 
       
yes  yes  yes  yes 
   job variables  no  yes  no  yes 
   year effects  no  yes  no  yes 
   year*job variables  no  yes  no  yes 
      
 
Details:  These regressions replicate those appearing in Table 3, with the addition of variables representing DB 
pension benefits expected at retirement  The value was reported in one of three different ways:  (1) over 95% of 
individuals with a DB pension in 1989-01 reported a periodic amount that they expect to receive when they leave 
their job; (2) about 2.5% of individuals with a DB pension in 1989-01 reported a lump-sum amount which they 
expect to receive; (3) the SCF reported expected pension wealth for 55% of individuals with a DB pension in 1983, 
based on information collected from employers.  We included the natural log of the present value of each of these 
variables, along with dummy variables indicating which of the three variables (if any) was reported for a given 
observation.  In regressions (1a), (4a), (5a), and (8a), the self-reported variable is included.  In regressions (1b), 
(4b), (5b), and (8b), the average value is included, imputed on the basis of log earnings, industry, occupation, 
education, unionization, and employer size, separately for men and women. 
   The numbering of the regressions parallels the numbering in Table 3.  Huber-White standard errors appear in 
parentheses; 
* indicates a confidence level of at least 90%, 
** 95%, 
*** 99%. 
For additional information, see notes to Table 3.    
Table 5:  Changes in the value of DB pensions (OLS regression results, SCF) 
  
Dependent variable:  expected monthly pension benefit (2001 dollars)
        
  Men  (mean of dependent variable = 1637) 
 (1)  (2) 
    
Independent variables:     
     
  year dummy, 1992    -32   (187)    -70    (201) 
  year dummy, 1995  -150   (161)  -253    (178) 
  year dummy, 1998  -222   (170)  -352
*   (187) 
  year dummy, 2001  -107   (193)  -202    (202) 
    
  Women  (mean of dependent variable = 1033) 
 (3)  (4) 
      
Independent variables:     
     
  year dummy, 1992  -333
*** (134) -357
*** (145) 
  year dummy, 1995    -40    (218)    -82    (245) 
  year dummy, 1998  -266
*   (141)  -294
**  (130) 
  year dummy, 2001  -224    (162)  -246    (161) 
    
Regression also includes:     
    
   age, tenure, experience  yes  yes 
   job variables  no  yes 
    
 
Data source:  Survey of Consumer Finances 1989, 92, 95, 98, 01. 
Sample:  Full-time employees with DB pensions who report their expected monthly benefit, excluding 
those who report tenure in excess of potential experience plus two (about 1.5% of full-time employees); 
those whose pension type is unknown (approximately 0.5% of the remaining sample); those with earnings 
in the top or bottom 1% of the distribution; those who report that they will receive a lump-sum benefit 
(2.5% of the remaining sample) and those who do not report a benefit (2.5% of the remaining sample). 
Details:  The coefficient estimates and Huber-White standard errors are computed from regressions run on 
multiple implicates, as in Rubin (1987).  The regressions were weighted using survey weights.  
* indicates a 
confidence level of at least 90%, 
** 95%, 
*** 99%.   
   Specifications:  (1) and (3) includes real weekly earnings (in 2001 dollars), age and age squared, potential 
experience and experience squared, current tenure (linear through quartic terms), and expected future 
tenure (linear through quartic terms).  (2) and (4) add job variables (4 education, 6 industry, 6 occupation, 
and 6 firm size dummies, industry* occupation, education*occupation, union coverage).   
Table 6:  The earnings premium associated with job tenure 
  
  Men 
 1983  1987 1991 1996 1998 2000 2002 
         
Years of tenure           
   5    13.9% ***   19.5 *** 15.0*** [87] 14.7*** [87] 10.4*** [91] 11.1*** [87]   8.8*** [96]
 10    21.3   ***   27.6 *** 22.5*** [87] 23.5 *** 17.5*** [96] 16.5*** [96] 14.1*** [96]
 15    24.6     30.7 *** 27.0 *** 28.6 *** 22.7*** [96] 20.4*** [96] 18.3*** [96]
 20    25.9    33.1 *** 30.6   * 31.8   * 27.0 ** [87] 24.5 ** [96] 22.3 ** [96]
 25    27.4    36.6  33.4  34.7  30.5      [87] 27.9      [96] 26.0      [96]
          
 Women 
          
Years of tenure             
   5    17.5 ***   19.6 *** 19.3 *** 16.4 ***   9.1*** [96]   9.0*** [96]   5.3*** [96]
 10    24.0 ***   29.4 *** 26.4 *** 25.3 *** 18.1*** [96] 14.9*** [96] 11.4*** [98]
 15    27.9 ***   34.0 
  30.2 *** 30.5 *** 26.3*** [87] 18.7 **  [98] 16.8*** [98]
 20    33.3 ***   36.2  35.1 *** 34.7  ** 32.9 ** 21.5       [98] 20.7       [98]
 25    40.6    37.7  41.6  39.0  36.8  24.2       [98] 23.5       [98]
          
 
Data source:  Outgoing rotation groups of the Current Population Survey tenure supplements of January 1983, 
1987, 1991, February 1996, 1998, and 2000, and January 2002. 
Sample:  Employees aged 21-59 who were working or had a job but were not at work, excluding those who report 
earnings in the top or bottom 1% of the distribution.  The sample size is 37,302 men and 36,024 women.  
Details:  Each cell in this table reports the estimated effect of years of job tenure on the natural log of the real 
wage, expressed as a percentage increase associated with a given number of years of tenure.  These estimates are 
obtained from regressions run separately on men and women.  The regressions include years of job tenure (with 
nonlinear terms included up to the fourth power), all interacted with the CPS year; years of potential experience 
(up to the fourth power), all interacted with the CPS year; a dummy for being a usual full-time worker; dummies 
for four education categories, all interacted with the CPS year; 51 industry dummies, interacted with a dummy for 
being in the public sector; and 45 occupation dummies, interacted with a dummy for being in the public sector.  
The real wage is defined as weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours. 
   All of the estimated earnings premia are significantly different from zero.  Two additional indications of 
statistical significance are reported; asterisks indicate significance of differences in the tenure premium across 
years of tenure in the same calendar year, while years indicate significance of differences in the tenure premium 
across calendar years for the same year of tenure.  The asterisks next to each value indicate the significance level 
on a test that compares the earnings premium in that cell with the one reported in the cell below; 
* indicates a 
confidence level on the F-statistics of at least 90%, 
** 95%, 
*** 99%.  The years reported in brackets next to each 
value report the most recent year in which the value in the cell is significantly lower (at least at the 90% confidence 
level) than the value in the cell of a previous year.  These estimates are obtained from regressions run separately on 
men and women, weighted using the outgoing rotation group weights. 
  
Table 7:  Technological change and long-term jobs  
(OLS regression results, April 1993 CPS) 
  
  Dependent variable (averages, by industry): 
% with a DB pension  Average job tenure  Independent variables 
(averages, by industry):  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        












  past changes in computer use:     
    1984-89  -   0.370 
(0.332) 
- -  -0.09 
(5.23) 
- 
    1989-93  -   0.041 
(0.557) 
- -    0.13 
(8.77) 
- 
  Regression also includes:     
    firm size dummies  no  no  yes  no  no  yes 
        
(averages over past 10 













        










   7.0 
(27.0) 





   -6.93* 
  (4.12) 
-   -9.45 
 (6.47) 
  capital stock/10
6 - -0.24** 
 (0.10) 
-  -    -3.46*  
(2.02) 
- 
  Regression also includes:     
    firm size dummies  no  no  yes  no  no  yes 
        
 
Data source:  Current Population Survey, tenure, compensation, and firm size data from April 1993; 
computer use data from October 1984, 1989, 1993, and 1997.  Jorgenson Total Factor Productivity Series, 
1958-1996, obtained at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/jorgenson/data/35klem.html (Jorgenson, 
Gollop, and Fraumeni 1987). 
Sample:  The underlying samples from the CPS consist of workers aged 18-64 who are not self-employed.  
For the computer use data, sample sizes range from 49,601-54,647.  For the April 1993 CPS data, the 
sample is restricted further to those who know their pension status, and the sample size is 12,951.  Both 
data sets are then collapsed by taking averages within each of 50 industries, using the appropriate CPS 
sampling weight. 




*** 99%) from an OLS regression where the dependent variable is defined 
at the top of the column, some of the independent variables are reported in the rows, and the other 
independent variables are log weekly wages, a dummy for whether the employer offers health insurance, 
and, where noted, dummies for the size of the employer (which was reported in this tenure supplement but 
not others used in Table 8).  Each regression is weighted using the number of people in the industry in the 
April 1993 CPS.  Capital and investment are deflated to 1992 dollars. 
  
Table 8:  Technological change and long-term jobs  
(OLS regression results, multiple CPS tenure supplements) 
  
Dependent variable (averages, by industry): 
Average job tenure 
 
Independent variables 
(averages, by industry):  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        












  past change in  
  computer use 





        
Includes  year  dummies   X  X  X  X 
        
Sample  1983, 87, 91, 96, 98, 00  <1990  >1990 
        
(averages over past 10 













        
  TFP growth   9.0 
 (10.9) 
  14.5 
 (11.4) 




  28.9** 
 (16.1) 
  -0.3 
 (16.6) 
  level of investment/10
6   -8.6*** 
  (2.6) 
  -7.4*** 
  (2.7) 
-  -     -4.8 
   (4.7) 
  -9.2*** 
  (3.4) 
  capital stock/10
6 -  -    -4.6*** 
(1.3) 
  -4.0*** 
(1.3) 
- - 
        
Includes  year  dummies   X  X  X  X 
        
Sample  1983, 87, 91, 96  <1990  >1990 
        
 
Data source:  Current Population Survey, tenure and compensation data from January 1983, 1987, and 1991 
and February 1996, 1998, and 2000; computer use data from October 1984, 1989, 1993, and 1997.  
Jorgenson Total Factor Productivity Series, 1958-1996, obtained at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/ 
faculty/jorgenson/data/35klem.html (Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni 1987). 
Sample:  The underlying samples from the CPS consist of workers aged 18-64 who are not self-employed.  
For the computer use data, sample sizes range from 49,601-54,647.  For the tenure data, sample sizes range 
from 13,389-56,401.  Both data sets are then collapsed by taking averages within each of 50 industries, 
using the appropriate CPS sampling weight. 




*** 99%) from an OLS regression where the dependent variable is 
average job tenure, some of the independent variables are reported in the rows, and the other independent 
variable is log weekly wages.  Computer use data in a given year are constructed as linear combinations of 
the averages from the computer use supplements immediately preceding and following that year, where the 
weights depend on the number of years.  Each regression is weighted using the number of people in the 
industry in that year.  Capital and investment are deflated to 1992 dollars. 
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